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Differentially Private Data Generative Models
Abstract: Deep neural networks (DNNs) have recently been
widely adopted in various applications, and such success is
largely due to a combination of algorithmic breakthroughs,
computation resource improvements, and access to a large
amount of data. However, the large-scale data collections re-
quired for deep learning often contain sensitive information,
therefore raising many privacy concerns. Prior research has
shown several successful attacks in inferring sensitive train-
ing data information, such as model inversion [24, 26], mem-
bership inference [57], and generative adversarial networks
(GAN) based leakage attacks against collaborative deep learn-
ing [36]. In this paper, to enable learning efficiency as well as
to generate data with privacy guarantees and high utility, we
propose a differentially private autoencoder-based generative
model (DP-AuGM) and a differentially private variational
autoencoder-based generative model (DP-VaeGM). We eval-
uate the robustness of two proposed models. We show that
DP-AuGM can effectively defend against the model inversion,
membership inference, and GAN-based attacks. We also show
that DP-VaeGM is robust against the membership inference at-
tack. We conjecture that the key to defend against the model
inversion and GAN-based attacks is not due to differential pri-
vacy but the perturbation of training data. Finally, we demon-
strate that both DP-AuGM and DP-VaeGM can be easily inte-
grated with real-world machine learning applications, such as
machine learning as a service and federated learning, which
are otherwise threatened by the membership inference attack
and the GAN-based attack, respectively.
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1 Introduction
Advanced machine learning techniques, and in particular deep
neural networks (DNNs), have been applied with great success
to a variety of areas, including speech processing [35], medi-
cal diagnostics [17], image processing [16], and robotics [64].
Such success largely depends on massive collections of data
for training machine learning models. However, these data
collections often contain sensitive information and therefore
raise many privacy concerns. Several privacy violation attacks
have been proposed to show that it is possible to extract sensi-
tive and private information from different learning systems.
Specifically, Fredrikson et al. [26] proposed to infer sensi-
tive patients’ genomic markers by actively probing the outputs
from the model and auxiliary demographic information about
them. In a follow-up study, Fredrikson et al. [24] developed
a more robust model inversion attack using predicted confi-
dence values to recover confidential information of a training
set (e.g., human faces). Shokri and Shmatikov [57] proposed
a membership inference attack, which tries to predict whether
a data point belongs to the training set. More recently, a gen-
erative adversarial network (GAN) based attack against col-
laborative deep learning [36] was proposed against distributed
machine learning systems, where users collaboratively train
a model by sharing gradients of their locally trained mod-
els through a parameter server. The GAN-based attack has
shown that even when the training process is differentially
private [8, 48], it is still possible to mount an attack to ex-
tract sensitive information from original training data [36] as
trusted servers may leak information unintentionally. Given
the fact that Google has proposed federated learning based on
distributed machine learning [47] and has already deployed it
to mobile devices, such a GAN based attack [36] raises serious
privacy concerns.
In this paper, we propose to use differentially private data
generative models to publish differentially private synthetic
data that can both protect privacy and retain high data utility.
Such data generative models are trained over private/sensitive
data (we will denote it as private data to be aligned with the
definition in [49]) in a differentially private manner, and are
able to generate new surrogate data for later learning tasks. As
a result, the generated data preserves the statistical properties
of the private data, which enables high learning efficacy, while
also protecting the privacy of the private data. The approach
of using differentially private data generative models has sev-
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eral advantages. First, with the generative models, privacy can
be preserved even if the entire trained model or the generated
data is accessible to an adversary. Second, it can be easily in-
tegrated with other learning tasks without adding much over-
head, since only the training data is changed. Third, the data
generation process can be done locally on the user side, which
eliminates the need for a trusted server (that can be attacked
and compromised) for protecting the private data from users.
Finally, we can prove that any machine learning model trained
over the generated data is also differentially private w.r.t. the
private data.
To achieve this, we build two distinct differentially pri-
vate generative models. First, we propose a differentially
private autoencoder-based generative model (DP-AuGM).
DP-AuGM works for the scenario when private data is sen-
sitive (i.e., not suitable for releasing to public) while sharing it
with other parties will facilitate data analytics. As motivation,
consider a hospital not allowed to release its private medical
data to public for use, but wants to share the data with univer-
sities for, say, data-driven disease diagnosis studies [34, 55].
Under this scenario, instead of publishing the medical data di-
rectly, the hospital could locally use the private medical data to
train an autoencoder in a differentially private way [8] and then
publish it. Any university interested in researching disease di-
agnosis independently feeds into the autoencoder their own
small amounts of sanitized/public medical data for generating
new data for machine learning tasks. Here, the sanitized/public
data often refers to the publicly available data, such as [4, 7].
Ultimately, the private medical data owned by the hospital are
successfully synthesized with public data owned by each uni-
versity in a differentially private manner, so that the privacy of
the private medical data is preserved and the utility of the data-
driven disease study is retained. Another motivating example
is two companies that want to collaborate on a data intelligence
task. A data-rich company X may wish to aid company Y in
developing a model that helps maximize revenue, but is un-
willing or legally unable to share its data with Y directly due
to their sensitive nature. Again, company X can train a differ-
entially private autoencoder (i.e., DP-AuGM), on its large data
set and share it with company Y. Then company Y could use
its own, smaller, dataset along with the autoencoder to train a
model that synthesizes information from both datasets.
The key advantage of the DP-AuGM approach is that the
representation-learning task performed on the private data sig-
nificantly boosts the accuracy of the machine learning task, as
compared to using the public1 data alone, in cases where the
1 For simplicity, we refer to the dataset that is passed through the autoen-
coder as public. In the second motivating example, if company Y only uses
the trained model internally, both X’s and Y’s datasets remain private, but
public data has too few samples to successfully train a deep
learning model [40]. We demonstrate this using extensive ex-
periments on four datasets (i.e., MNIST, Adult Census Data,
Hospital Data, and Malware Data), showing that DP-AuGM
can achieve high data utility even under a small privacy bud-
get (i.e.,  < 1) for private data.
Second, we propose a differentially private variational
autoencoder-based generative model (DP-VaeGM). Compared
with the ordinary autoencoder, the VAE [39] has an extra sam-
pling layer which can sample data from a Gaussian distribu-
tion. Using this feature, DP-VaeGM is capable of generat-
ing an arbitrary amount of data by feeding Gaussian noise to
the model. Similar to DP-AuGM, the proposed DP-VaeGM is
trained on the private data in a differentially private way [8]
and is then released to public for use. Although imposing
Gaussian noise on the sampling layer is useful in generating
new data (i.e., capable of generating infinite data), we iden-
tify that the VAE does not perform stably in generating high-
quality data points. Thus, in our paper, we only evaluate DP-
VaeGM on the image dataset MNIST. We show that the data
generated from DP-VaeGM can successfully retain high util-
ity and preserve data privacy. Under the setting of  = 8 and
δ = 10−3, the prediction accuracy of DP-VaeGM is more than
97% on MNIST.
To further demonstrate the robustness of our two proposed
models, we evaluate both DP-AuGM and DP-VaeGM with
three existing attacks—model inversion attack [24, 26], mem-
bership inference attack [57], and GAN-based attack against
collaborative deep learning [36]. The results show that DP-
AuGM can effectively mitigate all of the aforementioned at-
tacks and DP-VaeGM is robust against the membership infer-
ence attack. As both DP-AuGM and DP-VaeGM satisfy dif-
ferential privacy, while only DP-AuGM is robust to the model
inversion and GAN-based attacks, we conjecture that the key
to defend against these two attacks is not due to differential
privacy but the perturbation of training data.
Finally, we integrate our proposed generative models with
two real-world applications, which are threatened by the afore-
mentioned attacks. The first application is machine learning
as a service (MLaaS). Traditionally, users need to upload all
of their data to the MLaaS (such as Amazon Machine Learn-
ing [1]) to train a model, due to the lack of computational re-
sources on the user side. However, if these platforms are com-
promised, all of the users’ data will be leaked. Thus, we pro-
pose to integrate DP-AuGM and DP-VaeGM with this appli-
cation, so that even if the platforms are compromised, the pri-
vacy of users’ data can still be protected. We empirically show
from an analysis perspective, we focus on the potential privacy leaks of
X’s data through either the shared autoencoder or the final trained model.
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that after being integrated with DP-AuGM and DP-VaeGM,
this application still maintains high utility. The second applica-
tion is federated learning [47], which has been recently shown
to be vulnerable to GAN-based attacks [36]. As DP-AuGM
is more effective in defending against this attack, we try to
combine DP-AuGM with this application. We show that for
federated learning, even under small privacy budgets ( = 1,
δ = 10−5), DP-AuGM only decreases original utility by 5%.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
– We propose two differentially private data generative
models DP-AuGM and DP-VaeGM, which can provide
differential privacy guarantees for the generated data, and
retain high data utility for various machine learning tasks.
In addition, we compare the learning efficiency of the
generated data with state-of-the-art private training meth-
ods. We show that the utility of DP-AuGM outperforms
Deep Learning with Differential Privacy (DP-DL) [8] and
Scalable Private Learning with PATE (sPATE) [49] under
any given privacy budget. We also show that DP-VaeGM
can achieve comparable learning efficiency in comparison
with DP-DL.
– We empirically evaluate and demonstrate that the pro-
posed model DP-AuGM is robust against existing pri-
vacy attacks—model inversion attack, membership infer-
ence attack, and GAN-based attack against collaborative
deep learning; DP-VaeGM is robust against the member-
ship inference attack. We conjecture that the key to defend
against model inversion and GAN-based attacks is to dis-
tort the training data while differential privacy is targeted
to protect membership privacy.
– We integrate the proposed generative models with ma-
chine learning as a service and federated learning to pro-
tect data privacy. We show that such integration can retain
high utility for these real-world applications, which are
currently threatened by privacy attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to build
and systematically examine differentially private data genera-
tive models that can defend against contemporary privacy at-
tacks on learning systems.
2 Background
In this section, we introduce some details about privacy at-
tacks, differential privacy, and data generative models.
2.1 Privacy Attacks on Learning Systems
Model Inversion Attack. This attack was first introduced by
Fredrikson et al. [26] and further developed in [24]. The goal
of this attack is to recover sensitive attributes within original
training data. For example, an attacker can infer the genome
type of patients from medical records data or recover distin-
guishable photos by attacking a facial recognition API. Such
a vulnerability mainly results from the rich information cap-
tured by the machine learning models, which can be leveraged
by the attacker to recover original training data by construct-
ing data records with high confidence. In this paper, we mainly
focus on a strong adversarial scenario where attackers have
white-box access to the model so as to evaluate the robustness
of our proposed differentially private mechanisms. In this con-
text, an attacker aims to reconstruct data used in the training
phase by minimizing the difference between hypothesized and
obtained confidence vectors from the machine learning mod-
els.
Membership Inference Attack. Shokri and Shmatikov [57]
proposed the membership inference attack to determine
whether a specific data record is within the training set. This
attack also takes advantage of rich information recorded in ma-
chine learning models. An attacker first generates data with
similar distribution as the original data by querying machine
learning models and then uses the generated data to train local
models (termed shadow models in [57]) to mimic the behavior
of the original models. Finally, the attacker can apply the data
provided by the local models to training a classifier and deter-
mine whether a given record belongs to the original training
dataset.
GAN-based Attack against Collaborative Deep Learning.
Hitaj et al. [36] proposed a GAN-based attack targeting differ-
entially private collaborative deep learning [56]. They showed
that an attacker may use GANs to generate instances which
well approximate data from other parties in a collaborative
setting. The adversarial generator is improved based on the
information returned from the trusted entity, and eventually
achieves high attack success rate in the collaborative scenario
even when differential privacy is guaranteed for each party.
2.2 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy provides strong privacy guarantees for
data privacy analysis [22]. It ensures that attackers cannot in-
fer sensitive information about input datasets merely based on
the algorithm outputs. The formal definition is as follows.
Definition 1. A randomized algorithm A : D → R with do-
main D and range R, is (, δ)-differentially private if for any
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two adjacent training datasets d, d′ ⊆ D, which differ by at
most one training point, and any subset of outputs S ⊆ R, it
satisfies that:
Pr[A(d) ∈ S] ≤ e Pr[A(d′) ∈ S] + δ.
The  parameter is often called a privacy budget: smaller bud-
gets yield stronger privacy guarantees. The second parameter δ
is a failure rate for which it is tolerated that the privacy bound
defined by  does not hold.
Deep Learning with Differential Privacy (DP-DL) [8]. DP-
DL achieves DP by injecting random noise in stochastic gra-
dient descent (SGD) algorithm. At each step of SGD, DP-DL
computes the gradient for a random subset of training points,
followed by clipping, averaging out each gradient, and adding
noise in order to protect privacy. DP-DL provides a differen-
tially private training algorithm with tight DP guarantees based
on moments accountant analysis [8].
2.3 Data Generative Models
Autoencoder. An autoencoder is a widely used unsupervised
learning model in many scenarios, such as natural language
processing [19] and image recognition [46]. Its goal is to learn
a representation of data, typically for the purpose of dimen-
sionality reduction [29, 61, 62]. It simultaneously trains an en-
coder, which transforms a high-dimenstional data point to a
low-dimensional representation, and a decoder, which recon-
structs a high-dimensional data point from the representation,
while trying to minimize the 2-norm distance l2 between the
original and reconstructed data. Through this process, the au-
toencoder is able to discard those irrelevant features and en-
hance the performance of machine learning models when fac-
ing high-dimensional input data.
Variational Autoencoder (VAE). Resembling the autoen-
coder, an variational autoencoder also comprises two parts: the
encoder and the decoder [39, 54] with a latent variable z sam-
pled from a prior distribution p(z) = pnoise. Different from
the autoencoder of which the encoder only tries to reduce the
data into lower dimensions, the encoder inside VAE tries to
encode the input data into a Gaussian probability density do-
main [39]. Mathematically, the encoder approximates q(z|x),
which is also a neural network (encoder), with input z condi-
tioned on the data x. Then, a representation of the data will be
sampled based on the output from the encoder. Finally, the de-
coder tries to reconstruct a data point based on sampled noise,
which approximates the posterior p(x|z). The two neural net-
works, encoder and decoder, are trained to maximize a lower
bound of the log-likelihood of the data log p(x):
Eq(z|x)[log p(x|z)]−KL(q(z|x)||p(z)),
where KL is the Kullback-Leibler divergence [18].
Sampling from the VAE is achieved by sampling from
the (typically Gaussian) prior p(z) and passing the samples
through the decoder network.
3 Differentially Private Data
Generative Models
3.1 Problem Statement
Let X be the set of training data containing sensitive informa-
tion, and we will denote it as private data similarly with [48].
We denoteM as a data generative model which is trained on
the private data, and is able to generate new data X ′ for later
training usage, as shown in Figure 1. To protect privacy of the
private data, the goal of the generative model is to prevent an
attacker from recovering X , or inferring sensitive information
from X based on X ′. Formally, we give the definition of the
differentially private generative model as below.
Definition 2. A generative modelM : D → Z with domainD
and range Z , is (, δ)-differentially private, if for any adjacent
private datasets X , Xˆ ⊆ D which only differ by one entry, and
any subset of output space S ⊆ Z , it satisfies that:
Pr[M(X ) ∈ S] ≤ e Pr[M(Xˆ ) ∈ S] + δ.
The goal of the proposed differentially private generative
model is to generate data with high utility while protecting
sensitive information within the data. Current research shows
that even algorithms proved to be differentially private can also
leak private information in the face of certain carefully crafted
attacks on different levels. Therefore, in this paper, we will
also analyze several existing attacks to show that the proposed
differentially private generative models can defend against the
state-of-the-art attacks.
3.2 Approach Overview
To protect private data privacy, we propose to use the private
data to train a differentially private generative model and use
this generative model to generate new synthetic data for fur-
ther learning tasks, which can both protect privacy of original
data and retain high data utility. As the newly generated data
is differentially private w.r.t. the private data, it will be hard
for attackers to recover or synthesize the private data, or in-
fer other information about the private data in learning tasks.
Specifically, we choose an autoencoder and a variational au-
toencoder (VAE) as our two generative models. The overview
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Fig. 1. Overview of proposed differentially private data generative models. Sensitive private training data X is fed into the generative
model M to generate private surrogate dataset X ′. After publishing X ′, different learning models can be trained on X ′ to protect pri-
vacy of X while achieving high learning accuracy (data utility).
of our proposed differentially private data generative models
is shown in Figure 1. First, the private data is used to train
the generative model with differential privacy, which is ei-
ther an autoencoder (DP-AuGM) or a variational autoencoder
(DP-VaeGM) based model. Then the generated data from the
trained differentially private generative model is published and
sent to targeted learning tasks. It should be noted that DP-
AuGM requires the users to hold a small amount of data (de-
noted as public data in the figure) to generate new data while
DP-VaeGM is able to directly generate an arbitrary number
of new data points by feeding Gaussian noise into the model.
The goal of our design is to ensure that the learning accuracy
on the generated data is high for ordinary users (high data util-
ity), while the attackers cannot obtain sensitive information
from the private data.
3.3 Privacy and Utility Metrics
Here we will briefly introduce privacy and data utility metrics
used throughout the paper.
Privacy Metric. We refer to the privacy budget (, δ) as the
privacy metric during evaluation. We then evaluate how robust
the proposed generative models are against three state-of-the-
art attacks—model inversion attack [25], membership infer-
ence attack [57], and GAN-based attack against collaborative
deep learning [36]. Specifically, to quantitatively evaluate how
our models deal with the membership inference attack, we use
the metric privacy loss as defined in [51].
Privacy Loss (PL). Within membership inference attack, we
measure the privacy loss as the inference precision increment
over random guessing baseline (e.g., 0.5), where the adver-
sary’s attack precision rate P is defined as the fraction of
records that are correctly inferred as members of the training
set among all the positive predictions. We define privacy loss
PL as follows:
PL =
{
P−0.5
0.5 , if P > 0.5
0, otherwise
Utility Metric. We use the prediction accuracy to measure
utility for different models. Considering the goal of machine
learning is to build an effective prediction model, it is natu-
ral to evaluate how our proposed model performs in terms of
prediction accuracy. To be specific, we will evaluate the pre-
diction model which is trained on the generated data from the
differentially private generative model.
3.4 DP autoencoder-based Generative
Model (DP-AuGM)
Here we introduce how to apply the differentially private
autoencoder-based generative model (DP-AuGM) to protect
privacy of the private data while retaining high utility for the
generated data.
For DP-AuGM, we first train an autoencoder with our
private data using a differentially private training algorithm.
Then, we publish the encoder and drop the decoder. New data
will be generated (encoded) by feeding the users’ own data
(i.e., public data) into the encoder. These newly generated data
can be used to train the targeted learning systems in the fu-
ture with privacy guarantees for the private data. In this way,
the generated data could synthesize the information from both
private data and public data which enables high learning effi-
ciency, and provide privacy guarantees for private data at the
same time. As we will show in the evaluation section, the user
only needs a small amount of data to achieve good learning ef-
ficiency and we also compare the learning efficiency when the
user only uses his own data to do the training. During inference
time, the encoder will also be used to encode the test data for
model predictions. Since the encoder is differentially private
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w.r.t. private data, publishing the encoder does not compro-
mise privacy.
DP-AuGM proceeds as below:
– First, it is trained with private data using a differentially
private algorithm.
– Second, it generates new differentially private data by
feeding the public data to the encoder.
– Third, it uses the generated data to train any machine
learning model.
DP Analysis for DP-AuGM. In this paper, we adopt the
training algorithm developed by Abadi et al. [8] to achieve
differential privacy. Based on the moments accountant tech-
nique applied in [8], we obtain that the training algorithm is
(O(q√T ), δ)-differentially private. Here T is the number of
training steps, q is the sampling probability, and (, δ) de-
notes the privacy budget [8]. Further, by applying the post-
processing property of differential privacy [22], we can guar-
antee that the generated data is also differentially private w.r.t.
the private data and shares the same privacy bound with the
training algorithm. In addition, we will also prove that any
machine learning model which is trained on the generated data
from DP-AuGM, is also differentially private w.r.t. the private
data and shares the same privacy bound. This also shows the
benefit of training a differentially private generative model: we
only need to train one DP generative model and all the ma-
chine learning models which are trained over the generated
data will be differentially private w.r.t. the private data.
Theorem 1. Let M denote the differentially private genera-
tive model and X be the private data. Any machine learning
model trained over the generated data M(X ), is also differ-
entially private w.r.t. the private data X .
Proof. We denote F(X ) the machine learning model trained
on X , and F(M(X )) the learning model trained over the gen-
erated data. Then the proof is immediate by directly applying
the post-processing property of differential privacy [22].
3.5 DP Variational autoencoder-based
Generative Model (DP-VaeGM)
In this section, we will propose DP-VaeGM which could gen-
erate an arbitrary number of data points for usage.
DP-VaeGM proceeds as below:
– First, it initializes with n variational autoencoders (VAEs),
where n is the number of the classes for the specific data.
Each model Mi is responsible for generating the data of
a specific class 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We empirically observe that
training n generative models results in higher utility than
training a single model; we expect this is because a single
model would need to capture the class label latent variables
following a Gaussian distribution. Using n separate models
can also be used to generate a balanced dataset even if the
original data are imbalanced.
– Second, it uses a differentially private training algorithm
(such as DP-DL) to train each generative modelMi.
– Third, it samples data from Gaussian distribution N (0, 1)
for the sampling layer of each variational autoencoder. It
returns the entire generated data X ′ by taking the union of
generated data from each generative modelMi.
DP Analysis for DP-VaeGM. We have adopted the algo-
rithm developed by Abadi et al. [8] to train each VAE. Thus
each training algorithm is (O(q√T ), δ)-differentially private.
Next we prove that each variational autoencoder (VAE) is a
differentially private generate model (see Theorem 2) and the
entire DP-VaeGM is also (O(q√T ), δ)-differentially private
(see Theorem 3). Formally, to show proofs, we let X be the
private data, Θ be model parameters, and X ′ be the generated
data (the output of a single VAE).
Theorem 2. Let T : X → Θ be a VAE training algorithm
that is (, δ)-differentially private based on [8]. Let f : Θ →
X ′ be a mapping that maps model parameters to output, with
Gaussian noise generated from a sampling layer of VAE as
input. Then f ◦ T : X → X ′ is (, δ)-differentially private.
Proof. The proof is immediate by applying the post process-
ing property of differential privacy [22].
Theorem 3. Let a generative model (VAE) of class i Mi :
Xi → X ′i be (, δ)-differentially private. Then if Gn : X →
Πni=1X ′i is defined to be Gn =
⋃n
i=1Mi, Gn is (, δ)-
differentially private, for any integer n.
Proof. Given two adjacent datasets X1 and X2 = X1
⋃{b},
without loss of generalization, assume b belongs to
class k (1 ≤ k ≤ n). Fix any subset of events S ⊆ Πni=1X ′i .
Since the n generative models are pairwise independent, we
obtain Pr[Gn(X1) ∈ S] = Πni=1 Pr[Mi(x1i ) ∈ S], where
x1i ⊆ X1 =
⋃n
i=1 x
1
i denotes the training data of Xi for
the ith generative model. Similarly, Pr[Gn(X2) ∈ S] =
Πni=1 Pr[Mi(x2i ) ∈ S]. Since X1 and X2 only differ in b, we
have x1i = x2i and Pr[Mi(x1i ) ∈ S] = Pr[Mi(x2i ) ∈ S],
for any i 6= k. Since Mk is (, δ)-differentially private, then
we have Pr[Mk(x1k) ∈ S] ≤ e Pr[Mk(x2k) ∈ S] + δ.
Therefore, we obtain Pr[Gn(X1) ∈ S] = Πni=1 Pr[Mi(x1i ) ∈
S] = Pr[M1(x21) ∈ S] × · · · × Pr[Mk(x1k) ∈ S] × · · · ×
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Pr[Mn(x2n) ∈ S] ≤ eΠni=1 Pr[Mi(x2i ) ∈ S] + δ =
e Pr[Gn(X2) ∈ S] + δ. The inequality derives from the fact
that any probability is no greater than 1. Hence, Gn is (, δ)-
differentially private, for any n.
Remark. Both DP-VaeGM and DP-AuGM can realize differ-
entially private generative models w.r.t. the private data. The
main difference is that DP-AuGM requires users’ own data
(i.e., public data) to generate new data while DP-VaeGM can
generate infinite number of data points just based on Gaussian
noise. Although the feature of DP-VaeGM is pretty good, we
do notice that the generated data quality is not always stable
while DP-AuGM is always stable in terms of utility. More de-
tails are presented in the evaluation section.
4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we first describe datasets used for evaluation,
followed by the empirical results of two data generative mod-
els. Note that all the structures of generative models and ma-
chine learning model involved in the experiments are specified
in Appendix A.
4.1 Datasets
MNIST. MNIST [41] is the benchmark dataset containing
handwritten digits from 0 to 9, comprised of 60,000 training
and 10,000 test examples. Each handwritten grayscale image
of digits is centered in a 28×28 or 32×32 image. To be con-
sistent with [36], we choose to use the 32×32 version of
MNIST dataset when evaluating our generative models against
the GAN-based attack.
Adult Census Data. The Adult Census Dataset [43] includes
48,843 records with 14 sensitive attributes, including gender,
education level, marital status, and occupation. This dataset is
commonly used to predict whether an individual makes over
50K dollars in a year. 32,561 records serve as a training set
and 16,282 records are used for testing.
Hospital Data. This dataset is based on the Public Use Data
File released by the Texas Department of State Health Ser-
vices in 2010Q1 [5]. Within the data, there are personal sen-
sitive information, such as gender, age, race, length of stay,
and surgery procedure. We focus on the 10 most frequent
main surgery procedures, and exploit part of categorical fea-
tures to make inference for each patient. The resulting dataset
has 186,976 records with 776 binary features. We randomly
choose 36,000 instances as testing data and the rest serves as
the training data.
Malware Data. To demonstrate the generality of the pro-
posed models, we also include the Android mobile malware
dataset [15] for diversity purposes. This dataset is previously
used to determine whether an Android application is benign or
malicious based on 142 binary features, such as user permis-
sion request. We randomly choose 3,240 instances as training
data and 2,000 as testing data.
4.2 Evaluation of DP-AuGM
In this subsection, we first show how DP-AuGM performs
in terms of utility under different privacy budgets on four
datasets. To evaluate performance, for MNIST, we split the
test data into two parts: 90% is used as public data and the
rest 10% is used as a hold out to evaluate test performance
as in [49]. For Adult Census Data, Hospital Data, and Mal-
ware Data, the test data is evenly split into two halves: the first
serves as public data and the second is used for evaluating test
performance. All the training data is regarded as private data
of which the privacy we aim to protect. Then we analyze how
public data size influences DP-AuGM on MNIST dataset and
we also compare the learning efficacy between when only us-
ing public data for training and combining it with DP-AuGM.
In addition, we compare DP-AuGM with some state-of-art dif-
ferentially private learning methods.
Effect of Different Privacy Budgets. To evaluate the effects
of privacy budgets (i.e.,  and δ) on prediction accuracy for
machine learning models, we vary (, δ) to test learning effi-
ciency (i.e., the utility metric) on different datasets. The results
are shown in Figure 2(a)-(d). In these figures, each curve corre-
sponds to the best accuracy achieved given fixed δ, as  varies
between 0.2 and 8. In addition, we also show the baseline ac-
curacy (i.e., without DP-AuGM) on each dataset for the com-
parison. From Figure 2, we can see that the prediction accu-
racy decreases as the noise level increases ( decreases), while
we see DP-AuGM can still achieve comparable utility with the
baseline even when  is tight (i.e., around 1). When  = 8, for
all the datasets, the accuracy lags behind the baseline within
3%. This demonstrates that data generated by DP-AuGM can
preserve high data utility for subsequent learning tasks.
Efficacy of DP-AuGM. We further examine how DP-AuGM
helps boost the learning efficacy. We compare the learning ac-
curacy between only public data is used for training and by
combining both DP-AuGM and public data. For DP-AuGM,
we set the private budge  and δ to be 1 and 10−5, respec-
tively. We do the comparisons on all the datasets and the re-
sult is presented in Table 1. As we can see from Table 1,
after using DP-AuGM, the learning accuracy increases by at
least 6% on all the datasets and by 34% on Malware Data
dataset. This actually demonstrates the significance of using
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Fig. 3. DP-AuGM and DP-VaeGM versus DP-DL
DP-AuGM for sharing the information of private data. Since
the amount of private data is huge, DP-AuGM trained over
the private data can better capture the inner representations of
the dataset, which further boosts the following learning accu-
racy of machine learning models. In addition, we also examine
how utility is affected when different amounts of public data is
available on the dataset MNIST. We vary the public data size
from 1,000 to 9,000 in steps of 1,000. The privacy budget  and
δ is set as 1 and 10−5, respectively. As we can see from Fig-
ure 4, the public data size affects test accuracy slightly, only
within 7% dropping. This suggests that private data plays a
major role in generating high-utility data for learning efficacy.
In Comparison with the Differentially Private Training Al-
gorithm (DP-DL). Although our method leverages DP-DL as
the differentially private training algorithm, we show that our
method better performs in training the machine learning model
under the same privacy budget. For comparison, we choose the
feed-forward neural network model with the architecture and
Datasets With DP-AuGM Without DP-AuGM
MNIST 0.95 0.89
Adult Census Data 0.78 0.64
Hospital Data 0.56 0.42
Malware Data 0.96 0.62
Table 1. Comparisons of training accuracy between using only
public data for training and using both DP-AuGM and public data
MNIST dataset specified in [8]. In addition, we use 90% of
the test data as public data and the rest acts as the test data
for both methods. For DP-DL, the public data simply serves
as its training data. As for the privacy budget, we fix δ as 10−5
and vary  from 0.5 to 8. The result is shown in Figure 3(a).
As we can see from Figure 3(a), under different , our method
outperforms DP-DL consistently. Furthermore, DP-DL needs
to be performed each time on a new model while DP-AuGM
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Models Privacy budget  Privacy budget δ Accuracy Baseline
sPATE [49] 1.97 10−5 0.985 0.992
DP-AuGM 1.97 10−5 0.987 0.992
Table 2. Comparisons between DP-AuGM and sPATE on MNIST
only needs to be trained once. Then any model which is trained
over the generated data from DP-AuGM is differentially pri-
vate w.r.t. the private data (i.e., with the same property of dif-
ferential privacy achieved by DP-DL). Hence, we can see that
DP-AuGM outperforms DP-DL both in accuracy and compu-
tational efficiency.
In Comparison with Scalable Private Learning with PATE.
Scalable Private Learning with PATE (sPATE) [49] is recently
proposed by Papernot et al., which can also realize a differ-
entially private training algorithm w.r.t. the private data and
provides privacy protection for partial data. We try to com-
pare sPATE with DP-AuGM on MNIST in terms of the utility
metric. Here, the baseline denotes the scenario where no pri-
vacy protection mechanism is used. We follow [49] to split
the test data into two parts. One part serves as public data
while the second serves as test data. We also use the same
CNN machine-learning model as specified in [49]. As we can
see from Table 2, DP-AuGM outperforms sPATE by 0.2% in
terms of prediction accuracy and only sits below the baseline
by 0.5%. Note that the reason of making a comparison at a
specific pair of the privacy budget is that sPATE [49] only
presents the result on MNIST for a specific pair of differential
privacy parameters. Furthermore, DP-AuGM surpasses sPATE
in terms of computational efficiency since 250 teacher models
are used in sPATE while DP-AuGM only needs to be trained
once.
4.3 Evaluation of DP-VaeGM
In this subsection, we empirically evaluate utility performance
of our proposed data generative model DP-VaeGM. As VAE
is usually used to generate high quality images, now we only
evaluate DP-VaeGM on the image dataset MNIST.
Effect of Different Privacy Budgets. We vary the privacy
budget to test DP-VaeGM on MNIST dataset. The result is
shown in Figure 5, where each curve corresponds to the best
accuracy given fixed δ, and  varies between 0.2 and 8. We
show the baseline accuracy (i.e., without DP-VaeGM) using
the red line. From this figure, we can see that DP-VaeGM
can achieve comparable utility w.r.t. the baseline. For instance,
when  is greater than 1, the accuracy is always higher than
92%. When  is 8 and δ is 10−2, the accuracy is over 97%
which is lower than the baseline by 2%. Thus, we can see that
DP-VaeGM has the potential to generate data with high train-
ing utility while providing privacy guarantees for private data.
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Fig. 5. Accuracy of DP-VaeGM under various privacy budgets on
MNIST dataset
In Comparison with the Differentially Private Training Al-
gorithm (DP-DL). We compare DP-VaeGM with DP-DL on
MNIST. As for the privacy budget, we fix δ as 10−5 and vary
 from 0.5 to 8. From Figure 3(b), we can see that DP-VaeGM
achieves comparable utility with DP-DL. In addition, we want
to stress that for DP-VaeGM, once the data is generated, all
machine learning models trained on the generated data will be-
come differentially private w.r.t the private data while for DP-
DL, we need to rerun the algorithm for each new model. Thus,
DP-VaeGM outperforms DP-DL in computation efficiency.
In Comparison with Scalable Private Learning with PATE.
We also compare Scalable Private Learning with PATE
(sPATE) [49] with DP-VaeGM on MNIST in terms of the util-
ity metric (i.e., prediction accuracy). The learning model ap-
plies the CNN structure as specified in [49]. As sPATE requires
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Models Privacy budget  Privacy budget δ Accuracy
sPATE [49] 1.97 10−5 0.985
DP-VaeGM 1.97 10−5 0.968
Table 3. Comparisons between DP-VaeGM and sPATE on MNIST
the presence of public data, we split the test data into two parts
in the same way as specified by [49]. Considering DP-VaeGM
does not need public data, private data is discarded for DP-
VaeGM. In addition, the privacy budget  and δ is set to be
1.97 and 10−5, respectively. From Table 3, we can see that
DP-VaeGM falls behind sPATE by approximately 2%. This is
because that sPATE trains the model using both public and pri-
vate data while DP-VaeGM is only trained with private data.
Remark. We have empirically shown that DP-AuGM and DP-
VaeGM can achieve high data utility and protect privacy of
private data at the same time.
5 Defending against Existing
Attacks
To demonstrate the robustness of proposed generative models,
here we evaluate the models against three state-of-the-art pri-
vacy violation attacks—model inversion attack, membership
inference attack, and the GAN-based attack against collabora-
tive deep learning.
5.1 Model Inversion Attack
We choose to use the one-layer neural network to mount the
model inversion attack [24] over MNIST dataset setting be-
cause it is easier to check the effectiveness of the model inver-
sion attack on image dataset. Note that Hitaj et al. [36] claimed
that the model inversion attack might not work on convolu-
tional neural networks (CNN). For the original attack, we use
all the training data to train the one-layer neural network and
then try to recover digit 0 by exploiting the confidence val-
ues [24]. As we can see from Figure 6a, the digit 0 is almost
recovered. Then, we try to evaluate how DP-AuGM performs
in defending against the attack. We use the generated data from
DP-AuGM to train the one-layer neural network. The privacy
budget  and δ for DP-AuGM is set to be 1 and 10−5, respec-
tively. We then mount the same model inversion attack on the
one-layer neural network. Figure 6b shows the result after de-
ploying DP-AuGM. We can clearly see that after deploying
DP-AuGM, nothing can be learned from the attack result as
shown in Figure 6b. So we can see DP-AuGM can mitigate
(a) Original attack (b) Attack with DP-
AuGM
Fig. 6. The efficiency of the model inversion attack on MNIST
dataset before and after deploying DP-AuGM
Original attack (MNIST) 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0
With DP-AuGM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
With DP-VaeGM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 4. Privacy loss for the membership inference attack
the model inversion attack effectively. However, we find that
DP-VaeGM is not robust enough in mitigating the model in-
version attack. We will discuss this in Section 5.4.
5.2 Membership Inference Attack
We evaluate how DP-AuGM and DP-VaeGM perform in mit-
igating membership inference attack on MNIST using one-
layer neural networks. The training set size is set to be 1,000
and the number of shadow models [57] is set to be 50. We
have set the privacy budget  and δ to be 1 and 10−5, respec-
tively. For this attack, we mainly consider whether this attack
can predict the existence of private data in the training set. To
evaluate the attack, we use the standard metric—precision, as
specified in [57] that the fraction of the records inferred as
members of the private training dataset that are indeed mem-
bers. The result is shown in Figure 7. As we can see from
Figure 7, after deploying DP-AuGM, the attack precision for
all the classes drops at least 10% and for some classes, the
attack precision is approaching zero, such as classes 2 and 5.
Similarly for DP-VaeGM, the attack precision drops over 20%
for all the classes. Thus, we conclude that, with DP-AuGM
and DP-VaeGM, the membership inference attack can be ef-
fectively defended against. The privacy loss on MNIST is also
tabulated in Table 4. As we can see, with our proposed gener-
ative models, the privacy loss for each class can be reduced to
zero.
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5.3 GAN-based Attack against
Collaborative Deep Learning
We choose to use the MNIST dataset to analyze GAN-based
attack since the simplicity of the dataset can boost the suc-
cess rate for the attacker. We create two participants in this
setting, where one serves as an adversary and the other serves
as an honest user, as suggested in [36]. We follow the same
model structure as specified in [36], where the CNN is used as
a discriminator and the DCGAN [52] is used as a generator.
Users can apply the proposed differentially private generated
data or original data to train their local models. We show de-
fense results for DP-AuGM in Figures 8 and 9, where Figure 8
represents the images obtained by adversaries without deploy-
ing generative models, while Figure 9 shows the obtained im-
ages which have been protected by DP-AuGM. As we can see
from Figure 9, the proposed model DP-AuGM significantly
thwarts the attacker’s attempt to recover anything from the pri-
vate data. However, similar with the results from model inver-
sion attack, DP-VaeGM is not robust enough to defend against
this attack. We will also discuss in detail in Section 5.4.
5.4 Discussion
Although both DP-VaeGM and DP-AuGM are differentially
private generative models, the results show that DP-AuGM is
robust against all the attacks while DP-VaeGM can only de-
fend against the membership inference attack. The main dif-
ference between these two models is that DP-AuGM uses the
output of the encoder (a part of the autoencoder) as the gener-
ated data while DP-VaeGM uses the output of the VAE. As
the encoder functions can reduce the dimensions of the in-
put data, we can envision that this operation will incur a big
norm distance between the input data and the generated data in
DP-AuGM. Considering the model inversion attack and GAN
attack both target at recovering part of the training data of a
model, the best result on DP-AuGM will be successfully re-
covering those encoded data while for DP-VaeGM, the result
will be recovering all. Therefore, it seems that the key to de-
fend against these two attacks is not only differential privacy,
but also the appearance of the generated data. This is also men-
tioned by Hitaj et al. [36], as they asserted that differential
privacy is not effective in mitigating the developed GAN at-
tack because differential privacy is not designed to solve such
a problem. Differential privacy in deep learning targets at pro-
tecting the specific elements of training data, while the goal of
these two attacks is to construct a data point which is similar
to the training data. Even if the attacks are successful, differ-
ential privacy is not violated since the specific data points are
not recovered.
Models Model Inversion Membership GAN-based Attack against
Attack Inference Attack Collaborative Deep Learning
DP-AuGM    
DP-VaeGM #  #
DP-DL #  #
sPATE #  #
 : Robust #: Not Robust
Table 5. Robustness of privacy preserving learning methods
against different privacy attacks
Remark. Extensive experiments have shown that DP-AuGM
can mitigate all the three attacks. DP-VaeGM is only robust
against the membership inference attack (see Table 5).
6 Deploying Data Generative
Models on Real-World
Applications
To demonstrate the applicability of DP-AuGM and DP-
VaeGM, we will show how they can be easily integrated with
Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) commonly supported
by major Internet companies and federated learning supported
by Google. We integrate DP-AuGM with both MLaaS and fed-
erated learning over all the datasets. We mainly focus on the
utility performance of DP-AuGM when integrated with fed-
erated learning, since federated learning is threatened by the
GAN-based attack but can be effectively defended against by
DP-AuGM. We integrate DP-VaeGM with MLaaS alone and
evaluate it on the image dataset MNIST, as currently VAEs are
usually used for generating images.
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Fig. 8. With the original attack (images generated by the GAN-based attack against collaborative deep learning on the MNIST dataset)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j)
Fig. 9. With DP-AuGM (images generated by the GAN-based attack against collaborative deep learning on the MNIST dataset)
6.1 Machine Learning as a Service
MLaaS platforms are cloud-based systems that provide simple
APIs as a web service for users who are interested in train-
ing and querying machine learning models. For a given task,
a user first submits the private data through a web page in-
terface or an mobile application created by developers, and
selects the features for the task. Next, the user chooses a ma-
chine learning model from the platform, tunes the parame-
ters of the model, and finally obtains the trained model. All
these processes can be completed inside the mobile applica-
tion. However, the private data submitted by innocent users
can be maliciously exploited if the platform is compromised,
which raises serious privacy concerns. In this paper, our DP-
AuGM and DP-VaeGM can serve as a data privacy protec-
tion module to protect privacy of the private data. To this end,
users can first build DP-AuGM or DP-VaeGM locally, train
the generative models with the private data, and then upload
the generated data for later training. As we will show in the
experiment, this will incur negligible utility loss for training,
while significantly protecting data privacy. With DP-AuGM
and DP-VaeGM, even if these platforms are compromised, the
privacy of sensitive data can still be preserved. In addition, we
will show that training DP-AuGM and DP-VaeGM locally re-
quires only a few computational resources.
When applying the proposed DP-AuGM and DP-VaeGM
to MLaaS, we choose to examine three mainstream MLaaS
platforms, which are Google Prediction API [2], Amazon
Machine Learning [1], and Microsoft Azure Machine Learn-
ing [3]. We then set the differential privacy budget  and δ to
be 1 and 10−5, respectively, for DP-VaeGM and DP-AuGM.
Similar with the evaluation section, we regard all the training
data as private data and for DP-AuGM, we split the test data
the same way as we do in Section 4.2. As we can see from
Figure 10, using the generated data by DP-AuGM for training,
we can achieve comparatively high accuracy (accuracy deteri-
orating within 8%) on all three platforms for all datasets. Strik-
ingly, we find that the model trained with generated data some-
times even outperforms the one trained with original data (see
trained models on Amazon over MNIST). For DP-VaeGM, the
result is shown in Figure 10a. We can see that DP-VaeGM can
achieve comparable utility (accuracy deteriorating within 3%)
on all the three platforms on MNIST. This clearly shows that
DP-VaeGM and DP-AuGM have the potential to be well inte-
grated into MLaaS platforms and provide privacy guarantees
for users’ private data and retain high data utility at the same
time.
Furthermore, we show the time cost of training DP-
AuGM (58.2s) and DP-VaeGM (27.9s) under 10 epochs on
MNIST dataset. The evaluation is done with Intel Xeon CPU
with 2.6GHZ, GPU of GeForce GTX 680, Ubuntu 14.04 and
Tensorflow. Most recently, Tensorflow Mobile [6] has been
proposed to deploy machine learning algorithms on mobile de-
vices. We, therefore, believe it will cost much less to train such
generative models locally on mobile devices.
6.2 Federated Learning
Federated learning [47], which is proposed by Google, enables
mobile users to collaboratively train a shared prediction model
and keep all their distributed training data local. Users typi-
cally train the model locally on their own device, upload the
summarized parameters as a small focused update, and down-
load the parameters averaged with other users’ updates collab-
oratively using secure multiparty computation (MPC), without
needing to share their personal training data in the cloud.
Federated learning is demonstrated to be private since the
individual users’ data is stored locally and the updates are se-
curely aggregated by leveraging MPC to compute model pa-
rameters. However, the recent paper [36] declares that feder-
ated learning is secure only if we consider the attacker is the
cloud provider who scrutinizes individual updates. If the at-
tackers are the casual colluding participants, private data of
one participant can still be recovered by other users who aim
to attack. Hitaj et al. [36] have shown that only applying differ-
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Fig. 10. Accuracy of trained models when integrating proposed generative models with MLaaS and federated learning
ential privacy in federated learning is not sufficient to mitigate
the GAN-based attack, and a malicious user is able to success-
fully recover private data of others.
In Section 5, we show that DP-AuGM is robust enough to
mitigate the GAN attack. Thus, in this section, we will mainly
consider whether DP-AuGM can be well integrated into the
federated learning to protect privacy and retain high data util-
ity. We show the concrete steps toward integrating DP-AuGM
as below. Note that the first two steps are added to the original
federated learning platform.
1. Users first train DP-AuGM locally with the private data.
2. After training DP-AuGM, users use DP-AuGM and public
data to generate new training data.
3. Users train the local model with generated data locally and
upload the summarized parameters to the server.
Next we will empirically show that DP-AuGM can be well
integrated into federated learning over four datasets.
Settings. The structure of an autoencoder and differential pri-
vacy parameters can be specified by a central server such as
Google, and will be publicly available to any user. As a proof
of concept, we hereby set the differential privacy parameters 
and δ to be 1 and 10−5, respectively. For each user in the fed-
erated learning, we evenly split the private data and public data
for usage.
Hyper-parameters. We set the default learning rate to be
0.001, the batch size to be 100, the number of users to be 10,
and the uploading fraction to be 0.1. We will also test how
DP-AuGM performs across different parameters later.
In Comparison with the Original Federated Learning. We
apply DP-AuGM to federated learning and compare it with the
original setting without DP-AuGM. As we can see from Fig-
ure 10e, after we add DP-AuGM model to the pipeline, the ac-
curacy drops only within 5% for all datasets. Hence, it shows
the proposed DP-AuGM can be well integrated into federated
learning without affecting its utility too much. In the follow-
ing part, we study in detail about the model sensitivity on the
MNIST dataset.
Effect of Other Parameters. We further examine the effect of
the number of users and the upload fraction over the differen-
tially private federated learning model.
(a) Number of Users. We choose the number of users to be
10, 20, and 40. From Figure 11a, we can see the difference in
number of users will only affect the speed of convergence a bit
without affecting the final data utility. We find that although
more users will take slightly more time for the model to con-
verge, the accuracy of the differentially private model actually
converges to the same result within 50 epochs.
(b) Upload Fraction. We choose the upload fraction as 0.001,
0.01, and 0.1 to analyze the proposed method. As we can see
from Figure 11b, different learning rates only have negligible
impacts on the trained model.
Remark. We have shown that DP-AuGM can be well inte-
grated with MLaaS and federated learning, and DP-VaeGM
can be well integrated with MLaaS. The integrated models can
protect privacy and preserve high data utility at the same time.
7 Related Work
7.1 Privacy Attacks on Machine Learning
Models
Specifically, Homer et al. [37] show that it is possible to learn
whether a target individual was related to certain disease by
comparing the target’s profile against the aggregated informa-
tion obtained from public sources. This attack was then ex-
tended by Wang et al. [63] by performing correlation attacks,
without prior knowledge about the target. Backes et al. [11]
propose to conduct the membership inference attack against
individuals contributing their microRNA expressions to scien-
tific studies. If an attacker can learn information about individ-
ual’s genome expression, he can potentially infer/profile the
victim’s future/historical health records, which can lead to se-
vere consequences. Shokri and Shmatikov [57] later show that
machine learning models can leak information about medical
data records by performing membership attack against well
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Fig. 11. The performance of federated learning integrated DP-AuGM under different hyper-parameters
trained models. Recently, Hitaj et al. [36] show that a GAN-
based attack can compromise user privacy in the collaborative
learning setting [56], where each participant collaboratively
trains his or her own model with private data locally. Hitaj
et al. [36] also warn that simply adding differentially private
noise is not robust enough to mitigate the attack. In addition,
Hayes et al. [33] investigate the membership inference attack
for generative models by using GANs [30] to detect overfitting
and recognize training inputs. More recently, Liu et al. [44]
define the co-membership inference attack against generative
models.
Given these existing privacy attacks, learning with gen-
erated data from DP generative models can potentially de-
fend against them, such as the representative model inversion
attack, membership inference attack, and GAN-based attack
against collaborative deep learning. To the best of our knowl-
edge, the learning method that can defend against all these at-
tacks has not been proposed or systematically examined be-
fore.
7.2 Differentially Private Learning
Methods
The goal of differentially private learning models is to pro-
tect sensitive information of individuals within the training
set. Differential privacy is a strong and common notion to
protect the data privacy [22]. Differential privacy can also
be used to mitigate membership inference attacks, as its
indistinguishability-based definition formally proves that the
presence or absence of an instance does not affect the output
of the learned model significantly [57]. A common approach
to achieving differential privacy is to add noise from Lapla-
cian [20] or Gaussian distribution [21] whose variance is de-
termined by the privacy budget. In practice, differentially pri-
vate schemes are often tailored to the spatio-temporal location
privacy analysis [9, 45, 53, 58, 60].
To protect the privacy of machine learning models, ran-
dom noise can be injected to input, output, and objectives of
the models. Erlingsson et al. [23] propose to randomize the
input and show that the randomized input still allows data col-
lectors to gather meaningful statistics for training. Chaudhuri
et al. [14] show that by adding noise to the cost function min-
imized during learning, -differential privacy can be achieved.
In terms of perturbing objectives, Shokri et al. [56] show that
deep neural networks can be trained with multi-party com-
putations from perturbed model parameters to achieve differ-
ential privacy guarantees. Deep learning with differential pri-
vacy is proposed [8] by adding noise to the gradient during
each iteration. They further use moment accountant to keep
track of the spent privacy budget during the training phase.
However, the prediction accuracy of the deep learning sys-
tem will degrade more than 13% over the CIFAR-10 dataset
when large differential privacy noise is added [8], which is
unacceptable in many real-world applications where high pre-
diction accuracy is pursued, such as autonomous driving [27]
and face recognition [31]. This is also aligned with the warn-
ing proposed by Hitaj et al. [36] that using differential privacy
to provide strong privacy guarantees cannot be applied to all
scenarios, especially where the GAN-based attack can be ap-
plied. Later, private aggregation of teacher ensembles (PATE)
has been proposed, which first learns an ensemble of teacher
models on a disjoint subset of training data, and aggregates
the output of these teacher models to train a differentially pri-
vate student model for prediction [48]. The queries performed
on the teacher models are designed to minimize the privacy
cost of these queries. Once the student models are trained, the
teacher models can be discarded. PATE is within the scope
of knowledge aggregation and transfer for privacy [32, 50].
An improved version of PATE, scalable PATE, is proposed by
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introducing new aggregation algorithm to achieve better data
utility [49].
At inference, random noise can also be introduced to
the output to protect privacy. However, this severely decays
the test accuracy, because the amount of noise introduced in-
creases with the number of inference queries answered by
the machine learning model. Note that homomorphic encryp-
tion [28] can also be applied to protect the confidentiality of
each individual input. The main limitations are the perfor-
mance overhead and the restricted set of arithmetic operations
supported by homomorphic encryption.
Various approaches have been proposed for the automatic
discovery of sensitive entities, such as identifiers, and redact
them to protect privacy. The simplest of these rely on a large
collection of rules, dictionaries, and regular expressions (e.g.,
[12, 59]). Chakaravarthy et al. [13] proposed an automated
data sanitization algorithm aimed at removing sensitive iden-
tifiers while inducing the least distortion to the contents of
documents. However, this algorithm assumes that sensitive en-
tities, as well as any possible related entities, have already
been labeled. Similarly, Jiang et al. [38] have developed the
t-plausibility algorithm to replace the known (labeled) sensi-
tive identifiers within the documents and guarantee that the
sanitized document is associated with at least t documents.
Li et al. [42] have proposed a game theoretic framework for
automatic redacting sensitive information. In general, finding
and redacting sensitive information with high accuracy is still
challenging.
In addition, there has been recent work on making gen-
erative neural networks differentially private [10]. It achieved
their differentially private generative models on VAEs by using
differentially private kernel k-means and differentially private
gradient descent. Different from their work, we realize differ-
entially private generative models on both autoencoders and
VAEs. We further show that our proposed methods can miti-
gate realistic privacy attacks and can seamlessly be applied to
real-world applications.
In general, unlike previously proposed techniques, our
proposed differentially private generative models can guaran-
tee differential privacy while maintaining data utility for learn-
ing tasks. Our proposed models achieve all three goals: protect
privacy of training data; enable users to locally customize the
privacy preference by configuring the generative models; re-
tain high data utility for generated data. The proposed mod-
els achieve these goals at a much lower computation cost than
aforementioned differentially private mechanisms and crypto-
graphic techniques, such as secure multi-party computation or
homomorphic encryption [28]. Our generative models can also
seamlessly be integrated with MLaaS and federated learning in
practice.
8 Conclusion
We have designed, implemented, and evaluated two differ-
entially private data generative models—a differentially pri-
vate autoencoder-based generative model (DP-AuGM) and a
differentially private variational autoencoder-based generative
model (DP-VaeGM). We show that both models can provide
strong privacy guarantees and retain high data utility for ma-
chine learning tasks. We empirically demonstrate that DP-
AuGM is robust against the model inversion attack, member-
ship inference attack, and GAN-based attack against collab-
orative deep learning, and DP-VaeGM is robust against the
membership inference attack. We conjecture that the key to
defend against model inversion and GAN-based attacks is to
distort the training data while differential privacy is targeted
to protect membership privacy. Furthermore, we show that
the proposed generative models can be easily integrated with
two real-world applications—machine learning as a service
and federated learning, which are previously threatened by the
membership inference attack and GAN-based attack, respec-
tively. We demonstrate that the integrated system can both pro-
tect privacy of users’ data and retain high data utility.
Through the study of privacy attacks and corresponding
defensive methods, we here emphasize that it is important to
generate differentially private synthetic data for various ma-
chine learning systems to secure current learning tasks. As we
are the first to propose differentially private data generative
models that can defend against the contemporary privacy vio-
lation attacks, we hope that our work will help pave the way
toward designing more effective differentially private learning
methods.
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Appendix
A Model Architectures
MNIST Adult Census Data Texas Hospital Stays Data Malware Data
FC(400)+Sigmoid FC(6)+Sigmoid FC(400)+Sigmoid FC(50)+Sigmoid
FC(256)+Sigmoid FC(100)+Sigmoid FC(776)+Sigmoid FC(142)+Sigmoid
FC(400)+Sigmoid
FC(784)+Sigmoid
Table 6. Model structures of DP-AuGM over different datasets
MNIST
FC(500)+Sigmoid
FC(500)+Sigmoid
FC(20)+Sigmoid ; FC(20)+Sigmoid
Sampling Vector(20)
FC(500)+Sigmoid
FC(500)+Sigmoid
FC(784)+Sigmoid
Table 7. Model structures of DP-VaeGM over MNIST
MNIST Adult Census Data Texas Hospital Stays Data Malware Data
Conv(5x5,1,32)+Relu FC(16)+Relu FC(200)+Relu FC(4)+Relu
MaxPooling(2x2,2,2) FC(16)+Relu FC(100)+Relu FC(3)+Relu
Conv(5x5,32,64)+Relu FC(2) FC(10) FC(2)
MaxPooling(2x2,2,2)
Reshape(4x4x64)
FC(10)
Table 8. Structures of machine learning models over different
datasets with DP-AuGM
MNIST
Conv(5x5,1,32)+Relu
MaxPooling(2x2,2,2)
Conv(5x5,32,64)+Relu
MaxPooling(2x2,2,2)
Reshape(7x7x64)
FC(1024)
FC(10)
Table 9. Structures of machine learning models over different
datasets with DP-VaeGM
